Professional Liability by O\u27Neil, Debran L. et al.
SMU Annual Texas Survey




Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal
Joshua D. Kipp
Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal
Thomas S. Conner
Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation







During the Survey period, Texas courts issued important decisions in
professional liability actions of all types. The Texas Supreme Court clari-
fied a 2012 health care liability opinion that was causing inconsistencies
among the courts of appeals. The supreme court also addressed the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements in both the health care and legal
malpractice contexts. Finally, the Survey period included several deci-
sions related to director and officer liability that addressed outstanding
questions about the application of the business judgment rule to closely
held corporations; the viability of double derivative standing; the defini-
tion of the term “investment contract” under the Texas Securities Act;
the limitations period for suits brought against a partner to collect on
judgments against the partnership; whether Texas specific personal juris-
diction extended to non-resident corporate officers in securities fraud
cases; and whether joint venture status applied to certain types of real
estate partnerships.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONTINUES TO DEFINE THE SCOPE
OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT—CLAIMS AGAINST
PHARMACISTS MAY QUALIFY AS HEALTH CARE
LIABILITY CLAIMS
The Texas Medical Liability Act (codified as Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code Chapter 74) requires plaintiffs asserting a “health care
liability claim” (HCLC) to serve each defendant with an expert report
within 120 days after the defendant’s original answer or risk dismissal of
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the case with prejudice.1 Continuing the trajectory of its past decisions,
the Texas Supreme Court held in Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller that
claims against a compounding pharmacy and its licensed-pharmacist em-
ployees are HCLCs that require an expert report compliant with Chapter
74.2 This case addressed an issue of first impression: the application of
Chapter 74 to claims against pharmacists in general and compounding
pharmacists in particular.3
Plaintiff Stacey Miller was being treated by her physician, Dr. Ricardo
Tan, for symptoms related to Hepatitis C.4 As part of her treatment, Dr.
Tan administered weekly injections of lipoic acid to Miller during her vis-
its to his office. Dr. Tan had previously ordered twenty-three vials of li-
poic acid from Randol Mill Pharmacy, a licensed compounding pharmacy,
for use in his office.5 Dr. Tan’s order did not refer to any particular pa-
tient, but administered some of the lipoic acid to Miller. Miller suffered a
severe adverse reaction to her tenth injection, which resulted in a long
hospitalization, multiple blood transfusions, and permanent blindness in
both eyes. Miller sued Randol Mill Pharmacy, the pharmacy that com-
pounded the vial of lipoic acid, and several of Randol Mill’s licensed
pharmacists. Miller alleged that the defendants’ negligence in com-
pounding the lipoic acid, along with inadequate and inappropriate warn-
ings and instructions for use, made the lipoic acid defective, ineffective,
and unreasonably dangerous.6 Miller did not timely serve an expert re-
port as required under Chapter 74 for an HCLC, prompting Randol Mill
and the pharmacists to move to dismiss all claims against them. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed,
finding that the defendants were not “health care providers” and the
claims did not qualify as HCLCs under Chapter 74.7
The supreme court reversed.8 Noting that HCLCs can only be brought
against physicians and health care providers, the supreme court first
looked to the statute’s definition of “health care provider.”9 A health
care provider is defined in Chapter 74 as “any person, partnership, pro-
fessional association, corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed,
certified, registered, or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health
1. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2015).
2. Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller, 465 S.W.3d 612, 621–23 (Tex. 2015).
3. Id. at 617.
4. Id. at 614.
5. Id. Compounding pharmacies mix or alter drugs to create a medication that is
tailored to the needs of an individual patient and that is not otherwise commercially availa-
ble. Michael Snow, Seeing Through the Murky Vial: Does the FDA Have the Authority to
Stop Compounding Pharmacies from Pirate Manufacturing?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611
(2013).
6. Randol Mill Pharmacy, 465 S.W.3d at 615. Miller also sued Dr. Tan, but the claims
against Dr. Tan were dismissed and severed. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 614.
9. Id. at 615.
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care, including . . . a pharmacist.”10 However, the supreme court read this
general definition of “health care provider” in conjunction with Chapter
74’s specific definition of “pharmacist.”11 For purposes of Chapter 74, a
pharmacist is one who
performs those activities limited to the dispensing of prescription
medicines which result in health care liability claims and does not
include any other cause of action that may exist at common law
against them, including but not limited to causes of action for the
sale of mishandled or defective products.12
Because Miller’s claims focused on the compounding of a drug, rather
than an incorrectly filled prescription (to which courts agree Chapter 74
applies), the crux of the supreme court’s analysis focused on whether
Randol Mill was “dispensing prescription medicines” as contemplated by
Chapter 74.13
Under the Pharmacy Act, to “dispense” medicine means to compound
it for “delivery to the ultimate user or the user’s agent.”14 Although the
court of appeals found that Dr. Tan qualified as the user’s agent, it con-
cluded Randol Mill was not dispensing the medicine as defined by the
Pharmacy Act because Dr. Tan did not specify the patients for which the
drugs were intended when he ordered them.15 The supreme court dis-
agreed with this reasoning, pointing out that the Pharmacy Act allows
pharmacists to dispense reasonable quantities of drugs to a practitioner
for office use without knowing the end user’s identity.16 As such, the su-
preme court concluded Randol Mill was dispensing medication within the
meaning of Chapter 74.17
Once the supreme court concluded that Randol Mill and the pharma-
cists were health care providers under Chapter 74, it then looked to
whether the causes of action asserted by Miller met the definition of an
HCLC. The supreme court held that Miller’s claims that the pharmacists
negligently compounded the drug and failed to provide adequate warn-
ings and instructions clearly alleged “a departure from accepted stan-
dards of health care.”18 Hence, Miller’s claims were HCLCs. The
supreme court rejected Miller’s argument that her claims were product-
liability claims: because Miller questioned Randol Mill’s compliance with
compounding regulations, adjudication of her claims will require expert
testimony to determine compliance with those standards.19 Because
10. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(12)(A)(iv) (West 2015). Employ-
ees and independent contractors acting in the course and scope of employment are also
health care providers. Id. § 74.001(12)(B)(ii).
11. Randol Mill Pharmacy, 465 S.W.3d at 616–17.
12. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(22).
13. Randol Mill Pharmacy, 465 S.W.3d at 617–20.
14. Id. at 619–20.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 621.
18. Id. at 621–22.
19. Id. at 622.
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Miller’s allegations against Randol Mill and the pharmacists were HCLCs
under Chapter 74, the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss for Miller’s failure to serve an expert report.20
Pharmacists are the only type of healthcare providers that do not bene-
fit from the expert report requirements and damages caps of Chapter 74
in all circumstances.21 Before this case was decided, the supreme court
had not addressed or analyzed the scope of Chapter 74’s limited applica-
tion to pharmacists.22 Chapter 74’s expert report requirement was en-
acted to weed out and deter frivolous claims.23 Compounding
pharmacists feared that, without the protections of Chapter 74, the cus-
tomized nature of their pharmacy practice would be lumped in with
claims for mishandled or defective pharmaceutical products, which are
explicitly excluded from Chapter 74’s expert report requirements.24 The
supreme court’s holding in Randol Mill Pharmacy relieved those fears
and offered guidance on Chapter 74’s application to pharmacists.
B. SLIP AND FALL—HCLC OR NOT? TEXAS SUPREME COURT
CLARIFIES THE STANDARD FOR SAFETY-BASED CLAIMS
1. Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital
During the last Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court clarified its
2012 holding in Texas West Oaks Hospital, L.P. v. Williams, which stated
that a safety-standards-based claim against a health care provider does
not have to be “directly related to the provision of health care” in order
to fall within the protections of Chapter 74.25 Since the Williams decision,
lower courts have reached varying conclusions about how much of a con-
nection, if any, a safety-standards claim must have to the provision of
health care for it to be considered a HCLC.26 The supreme court granted
review on this issue in Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital and held that
not all falls in a hospital are considered an HCLC under Chapter 74.27
Lezlea Ross was visiting a patient at St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital
when she slipped and fell near the exit doors of the hospital where work-
ers were buffing and cleaning the floor.28 Ross sued St. Luke’s on a prem-
ises liability theory. Citing Williams, St. Luke’s asserted that Ross’s claim
was an HCLC and that her failure to serve an expert report required
20. Id.
21. See id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(22) (West 2015)).
22. Id. at 617.
23. Jonathan D. Nowlin, Scalpel, Please: Why the Definition of “Health Care Liability
Claim” in Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code Is Not As Clean-Cut As It
Could Be, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1247, 1255–56 (2011).
24. Id.; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance of Independent Pharmacists at 2, 9,
Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller, 465 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. 2015), 2014 WL 589096, at *2, *9;
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.001(a)(22).
25. Tex. West Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 186 (Tex. 2012).
26. See Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015).
27. Id. at 498.
28. Id. at 499.
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dismissal of her lawsuit with prejudice.29 The trial court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that under Wil-
liams, an HCLC does not require a connection between the provision of
health care and the safety standard allegedly breached.30 The supreme
court, however, reversed, explaining that “for a safety standards-based
claim to be an HCLC there must be a substantive nexus between the
safety standards allegedly violated and the provision of health care.”31
The supreme court first looked to the statutory definition of HCLC and
past decisions interpreting Chapter 74. The supreme court stressed that
the expert report requirement exists to deter frivolous claims; the re-
quirement was not meant to apply to every claim that arises from a health
care context.32 Further, hospitals are just one of the many types of busi-
nesses that have a duty to maintain a safe environment.33 Based on this,
the supreme court concluded that the legislature intended the safety stan-
dards referred to in the definition of HCLC to have a deeper relationship
with the provision of health care than the mere location of the occurrence
or the status of the defendant.34 Thus, to qualify as a HCLC, a safety-
standards claim must have “a substantive nexus between the safety stan-
dards allegedly violated and the provision of health care. And the nexus
must be more than a ‘but for’ relationship.”35
The supreme court explained that the pivotal issue is whether “the
standards on which the claim is based implicate the defendant’s duties as
a health care provider, including its duties to provide for patient
safety.”36 The supreme court articulated seven factors that should be con-
sidered in making this determination:
1.  Did the alleged negligence of the defendant occur in the course of
the defendant’s performing tasks with the purpose of protecting pa-
tients from harm?
2.  Did the injuries occur in a place where patients might be during
the time they were receiving care, so that the obligation of the pro-
vider to protect persons who require special, medical care was
implicated?
3.  At the time of the injury was the claimant in the process of seek-
ing or receiving health care?
4.  At the time of the injury was the claimant providing or assisting in
providing health care?
5.  Is the alleged negligence based on safety standards arising from
professional duties owed by the health care provider?
6.  If an instrumentality was involved in the defendant’s alleged neg-
ligence, was it a type used in providing health care?
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 504.
32. Id. at 502. See, e.g., Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Tex. 2012).
33. Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 503.
34. Id. at 504.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 505.
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7.  Did the alleged negligence occur in the course of the defendant’s
taking action or failing to take action necessary to comply with
safety-related requirements set for health care providers by govern-
mental or accrediting agencies?37
Applying these factors, the supreme court concluded that Ross’s claim
against St. Luke’s was not a HCLC, and that the trial court erred in hold-
ing that Ross was required to serve an expert report to avoid dismissal of
her suit.38 Justices Lehrmann and Devine wrote a concurring opinion to
emphasize the significance of the third and fifth factors, opining that fo-
cusing on the specialized duty of care health care providers owe their
patients ensures that safety-based claims will implicate the “provision of
health care.”39
2. Reddic v. East Texas Medical Center Regional Health Care System
Several months after deciding Ross, the Texas Supreme Court issued a
per curium opinion in a factually similar case.40 Louisa Reddic was visit-
ing East Texas Medical Center-Crockett Hospital when she slipped on a
floor mat in the hospital exit area. Like the plaintiff in Ross, Reddic sued
the Hospital on a premises liability theory.41 The Hospital moved to dis-
miss the case for failure to serve an expert report.42 The trial court denied
the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that floor main-
tenance in an area frequented by patients had a sufficient relationship to
the provision of health care to qualify as a safety-based claim under
Chapter 74.43
The supreme court granted review and analyzed whether Reddic’s
claims were HCLCs based on the Ross factors.44 The Hospital argued
that, the holding in Ross was not determinative because the hospital in
Ross did not assert that the area where Ross fell was a patient care area,
and the record in Ross failed to demonstrate that the site of the fall was
subject to maintenance standards related to the provision of health
care.45 In support of its argument, the Hospital pointed to general safety
requirements under federal regulations for facilities participating in
Medicare, to standards for accreditation by the Joint Commission, and to
Texas Department of State Health Service licensure requirements, all of
which addressed the Hospital’s duty to provide a safe facility.46
The supreme court rejected the Hospital’s argument, holding that there
was no showing that the Hospital’s compliance or non-compliance with
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 506–07 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
40. Reddic v. East Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l Health Care Sys., 474 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. 2015)
(per curiam).




45. Id. at 674.
46. Id. at 675.
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any of these standards had a substantive relationship to the safety stan-
dards underlying Reddic’s claims.47 The supreme court reiterated that,
although floor maintenance in an area used by patients is related to the
provision of health care, to qualify as a HCLC there must be “more of a
relationship to the provision of health care than that [a claim] arises from
an occurrence within a hospital.”48 As such, the supreme court concluded
there was not “a substantive nexus between the safety standards Reddic
claim[ed] the Hospital violated and the hospital’s provision of health
care.”49 Because her claims were not HCLC’s, Reddic did not have to
serve an expert report to proceed with her case.50
3. Christus Spohn Health System Corporation v. Goodhew
Shortly before the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinions in Ross and
Reddic, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that an expert report
was required for a claim based on a patient’s fall in a restroom at a wound
care treatment center.51 During her recovery from hip surgery, Jeanne
Goodhew went to Christus Spohn Shoreline Wound Care Center for
treatment. Prior to meeting with the doctor, “Goodhew informed the
nurse that she needed to use the restroom.”52 With the walker provided
by the nurse, Goodhew entered the restroom, fell, and injured herself.
Goodhew argued that her claims were similar to those in cases in which a
hospital visitor fell and suffered an injury.53 The court of appeals, how-
ever, disagreed based on the fact that Goodhew was at the facility to re-
ceive medical treatment and was in the middle of an evaluation when her
need to use the restroom arose.54 The court of appeals relied on the Texas
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie to
conclude that Goodhew’s safety claims were directly related to the provi-
sion of health care.55
The facts of Goodhew fall somewhere between the facts of Ollie and
the facts of Ross and Reddic.56 Although Goodhew was decided prior to
the supreme court’s announcement of the Ross factors, the Goodhew slip
and fall could qualify as a safety-based HCLC, especially if special weight
47. Id. at 675.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 676.
50. Id.
51. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp. v. Goodhew, No. 13-14-00322-CV, 2015 WL
1284672, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 19, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
52. Id. at *1.
53. Id. at *3.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *7. The plaintiff in Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie was a patient when
she slipped on a wet bathroom floor during her post-operative confinement. Harris Meth-
odist Fort Worth v. Ollie, 342 S.W.3d 525, 525–26 (Tex. 2011). The Texas Supreme Court
held that the services a hospital provides its patients necessarily include those services re-
quired to meet patients’ fundamental needs, including safety. Id.
56. See Ollie, 342 S.W.3d at 525–26; Reddic v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg’l Health Care
Sys., 474 S.W.3d 672, 672–73 (Tex. 2015); Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d
496, 499 (Tex. 2015).
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was given to the third and fifth factors as encouraged by Justices
Lehrmann and Devine’s concurrence in Ross.57 Notably, the supreme
court denied Goodhew’s petition for review.58
C. FAILING TO FOLLOW CHAPTER 74’S ARBITRATION REQUIREMENTS
MAY NOT BE THE END OF THE ROAD FOR COMPELLING
ARBITRATION
The Texas Medical Liability Act requires any arbitration agreement be-
tween physicians or other health care providers and their patients to be in
writing, with a “notice in 10-point boldface type [that] clearly and con-
spicuously” states:
UNDER TEXAS LAW, THIS AGREEMENT IS INVALID AND
OF NO LEGAL EFFECT UNLESS IT IS ALSO SIGNED BY AN
ATTORNEY OF YOUR OWN CHOOSING. THIS AGREE-
MENT CONTAINS A WAIVER OF IMPORTANT LEGAL
RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY. YOU
SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT FIRST
CONSULTING WITH AN ATTORNEY.59
In the last Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held that failure to
include this statement in an arbitration agreement does not necessarily
bar a health care provider from compelling a case to arbitration.60
In Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, the supreme court addressed
whether § 74.451 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was pre-
empted by federal law or whether an exception under the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act (MFA) barred preemption.61 The beneficiaries of Elisa Zapata
(Beneficiaries) brought a lawsuit for negligence and wrongful death
against Fredericksburg Care Company (Fredericksburg), the nursing
home where Zapata was a resident patient when she died. Relying upon
an arbitration clause in the agreement Zapata signed before she entered
the nursing home, Fredericksburg filed a motion to compel arbitration.
The arbitration agreement, however, did not meet § 74.451 requirements.
But Fredericksburg argued that compliance was not required because
federal law preempted § 74.451.62 Fredericksburg contended that the use
of Medicare funds implicated interstate commerce, and therefore, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), not § 74.451, determined the enforce-
ability of the arbitration clause.63
57. Ollie, 342 S.W.3d at 526.
58. Goodhew v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., No. 15-0418, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 848
(Tex. Sept. 11, 2015).
59. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451(a) (West 2015).
60. Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. 2015).
61. Id. at 516.
62. Id. at 516–17.
63. Id. The Texas Supreme Court had previously ruled in In re Nexion Health at Hum-
ble, Inc. that evidence of Medicare payments to a health care provider on a patient’s behalf
was sufficient to establish interstate commerce and the FAA’s application to the case. In re
Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005).
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The Beneficiaries agreed that the FAA normally preempts § 74.451,
but argued that the MFA contained “an exemption from preemption[,
meaning state law governed the enforceability of the arbitration clause,]
for any federal law that could be ‘construed to invalidate, impair or su-
persede any state law enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance.’”64 The Beneficiaries posited that the legislative
purpose behind § 74.451 and its predecessor statutes was to protect and
manage medical malpractice and health care liability insurance policies.65
The trial court and court of appeals both agreed with the Beneficiaries.66
The supreme court, however, reversed after a close analysis of whether
§ 74.451 was enacted for the “purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance.”67 To reach its conclusion, the supreme court looked at § 74.451
through the lens of the MFA, which focused on “the relationship between
the insurance company and its policyholders.”68 For purposes of the
MFA, state laws that regulate the “business of insurance” are those aimed
at protecting, adjusting, managing or controlling the insurance company-
policyholder relationship.69 And, as the U.S. Supreme Court has held, a
state law’s weak “connection to the ultimate aim of insurance” is not
enough to avoid preemption under the MFA.70 The supreme court re-
viewed the legislative intent of the Texas Medical Liability Act and its
predecessor statute, the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act of Texas, and concluded the purpose of both was to “make health
care . . . more available and less expensive by reducing the cost of health
care liability claims” and “lowering malpractice insurance premiums.”71
However, this goal of inspiring lower insurance rates does not implicate
the relationship between the insurance company and their policy hold-
ers.72 Further, § 74.451 has no bearing on the performance of insurance
contracts because it does not address whether a claim is paid or denied,
the terms of insurance contracts, the rates insurance companies can
charge, or the type of policy insurance companies can issue.73 Given this,
64. Frederickburg Care Co., 461 S.W.3d at 517 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 518. The supreme court used the three-part test established under federal
law for determining the application of the MFA. Id. The MFA must satisfy the following
three elements for the exemption to apply: “(1) the federal statute does not specifically
relate to the ‘business of insurance,’ (2) the state law was enacted of the ‘purpose of regu-
lating the business of insurance,’ and (3) the federal statute operates to ‘invalidate, impair
or supersede’ the state law.” Id. (quoting Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141
F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998)). The supreme court noted that elements one and three were
clearly met, and therefore, focused its analysis on element two. Id. at 519.
68. Id. at 521–25 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 501 (1993)).
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id. (citing Fabe, 508 U.S. at 509). Examples of practices within the scope of the
MFA include the fixing of rates, the selling and advertising of policies, the licensing of
insurance companies and their agents, and the writing and performance of insurance con-
tracts. Id. at 522.
71. Id. at 523.
72. Id. at 524.
73. Id.
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the supreme court concluded that § 74.451’s tenuous impact on the “busi-
ness of insurance” was not enough to bring it under MFA protection.74
Hence, the trial court erred by denying Fredericksburg’s motion to com-
pel arbitration.
The supreme court’s holding in Frederickburg Care Co. makes arbitra-
tion a more viable option for healthcare providers and physicians who
prefer to resolve healthcare liability claims through arbitration rather
than litigation. Prior to this decision, healthcare providers likely saw the
strong arbitration language required by § 74.451 as off-putting to poten-
tial patients.75 That concern, along with the potential penalties for failing
to meet § 74.451’s specific requirements, was enough for most healthcare
providers to decide that the risk of an arbitration clause in any pre-treat-
ment agreement outweighed the benefit.76 Now, in certain circumstances,
healthcare providers who prefer to resolve disputes through arbitration
can include arbitration clauses without alarming patients with the lan-
guage in § 74.451. Healthcare providers, however, should still be mindful
that the FAA only preempts state law in certain circumstances—when
interstate commerce is involved, the arbitration clause is in writing, the
clause has been agreed to by all parties, and the clause covers the claim at
issue. Otherwise, compliance with § 74.451 is still required.
III. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION REQUIRED IN MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS
During the last Survey period, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals rejected attempts to fracture negligence claims into breach-of-fidu-
ciary-duty claims and shed light on the type of evidence that is sufficient
to establish causation in malpractice cases.77 In Neubaum v. Stanfield, the
Neubaums sued three lawyers for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
that allegedly occurred when the lawyers represented the Neubaums in a
usury suit brought by Buck Glove Company. In the underlying usury suit,
the jury rendered a judgment in favor of Buck Glove Company for $3.9
million in actual damages plus attorneys’ fees, but also rendered judg-
ment for the Neubaums on their counterclaim for money had and re-
ceived in the amount of $151,000. The Neubaums retained new counsel to
74. Id. at 525. The supreme court, applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent, analyzed
the purpose of Chapter 74 in its entirety and § 74.451 specifically. Id. Because the arbitra-
tion provision in § 74.451 applies to health care liability claims rather than insurance con-
tracts, it does not relate to the “business of insurance” any more than Chapter 74 as a
whole. Id. at 524–25.
75. See Matt Goodman, Texas High Court Ruling Frees Healthcare Providers To Elect
Arbitration In Malpractice Suits, D MAGAZINE (Mar. 10, 2015), http://health-
care.dmagazine.com/2015/03/10/texas-high-court-ruling-frees-healthcare-providers-to-elect
-arbitration-in-malpractice-suits/ [https://perma.cc/K9BN-2K85].
76. See Michael L. Hood & David M. Merryman, Med Mal Game Changer the Texas
Supreme Court Strikes Down Bar to Arbitration Agreements, 78 TEX. B.J. 638, 638 (2015).
77. See generally Neubaum v. Stanfield, 465 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015), rev’d, No. 15-0387, 2016 WL 3536865 (Tex. June 24, 2016).
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appeal the judgment. The court of appeals held that the trial evidence was
legally insufficient, reversed the trial court, and rendered judgment that
Buck Glove Company take nothing.78
The Neubaums then filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against their trial
counsel in the usury suit, alleging that their lawyers neglected to advise
them of the damages sought against them and failed to remove or more
adequately supervise the junior lawyer who did the majority of the work
in the usury suit.79 The lawyers sought summary judgment on various
grounds including that “the Neubaums had impermissibly fractured negli-
gence claims into breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims,” that the alleged con-
duct of the lawyers “did not the proximate cause any damage to the
Neubaums,” and that the lawyers “[could] not be held liable for an error
committed by the trial court in the usury suit.”80 The trial court granted
the lawyers’ motion and the Neubaums appealed.81
“The rule against fracturing a negligence claim” prevents a legal mal-
practice claim from being converted from a claim that sounds only in neg-
ligence into some other claim, such as breach of fiduciary duty.82 In
essence, the rule is that when the allegations in the complaint are that the
attorney did not exercise an ordinary degree of care, skill, or diligence,
negligence is the proper and sole cause of action.83 The court of appeals
in Neubaum v. Stanfield reinforced this rule and held that the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment as to the Neubaums’ breach of
fiduciary duty claims.84
The court of appeals then addressed the Neubaums’ negligence claim.85
In legal malpractice claims involving alleged negligence, an attorney’s
negligence causes damages when a client with competent counsel would
have obtained a more favorable result than the result the client re-
ceived.86 As the party moving for summary judgment, the lawyers had the
burden to prove that a more favorable result would not have been
achieved by competent counsel.87 The court of appeals determined that
the summary judgment evidence presented by the lawyers did not satisfy
this burden as a matter of law.88 Most glaringly, the lawyers did not pre-
sent expert testimony regarding causation.89 Texas courts previously held
that expert testimony is necessary to prove proximate cause regarding a
negligence claim against a litigation attorney because “determinations re-
garding the legal and procedural intricacies” and the impact of certain
78. Id.
79. Id. at 268–70.
80. Id. at 268–69.
81. Id. at 269.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 269–70.
84. Id. at 270.
85. See id. at 270–76.
86. Id. at 273.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 274.
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attorney behavior on the ultimate result is beyond the common under-
standing of the trier-of-fact.90 In part, this was because the lawyers ar-
gued that any damages to the Neubaums were caused by the trial court’s
erroneous rulings in the usury case and not the lawyers’ actions—a highly
technical consideration.91
The court of appeals’s causation analysis in this case is especially im-
portant. The court of appeals’s decision that expert testimony is required
for summary judgment on the issue of causation has wide repercussions
for legal malpractice claims. While the dissent argued that expert testi-
mony was not actually necessary,92 the majority made it clear that in or-
der for litigation attorneys to avoid liability on causation grounds for
malpractice stemming from alleged negligence in underlying litigation,
there is no replacement for expert testimony.93 Attorneys should be cau-
tious of filing summary judgment motions on these grounds without ex-
pert testimony.
B. INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN ATTORNEY-
CLIENT CONTRACTS AND THE DISCIPLINARY RULES
In Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Francisco “Frank”
Lopez, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether an arbitration provi-
sion in an attorney-client employment contract was enforceable.”94 The
provision at issue specified that the parties would arbitrate disputes aris-
ing between them. But the same provision excluded any claims concern-
ing the recovery of the law firm’s fees and expenses.95
The client, Francisco Lopez, engaged the law firm, Royston, Rayzor,
Vickery & Williams, LLP, to represent in him in a divorce from his al-
leged wife who had won the $11 million playing the lottery.96 After the
divorce action settled at mediation, Lopez sued the law firm claiming his
attorneys “induced him to accept an inadequate settlement.”97 The law
firm moved to compel the dispute to arbitration under the arbitration
provision in the attorney-client contract. The trial court denied the law
firm’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the
arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable and not
enforceable.98
The supreme court granted review and addressed three basic argu-
ments asserted by Lopez: (1) the arbitration provision was unconsciona-
ble; (2) enforcing the arbitration provision violated public policy; and (3)
90. Id.
91. Id. at 275.
92. Id. at 277–81.
93. Id. at 277.
94. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 497 (Tex.
2015).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 498.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the arbitration provision was illusory.99 After considering each of Lopez’s
arguments, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.100
Regarding unconscionability, the supreme court characterized Lopez’s
unconscionability claim as “essentially that the provision is oppressive
and grossly one-sided because it requires [Lopez] to arbitrate all his
claims against Royston, Rayzor, while allowing the firm to choose
whether to litigate or arbitrate the only claim it realistically would have
against him.”101 However, excepting a few specified disputes from the
scope of an arbitration provision does not necessarily render that provi-
sion one-sided and therefore unconscionable.102 While the court of ap-
peals recognized that “[t]he prospective attorney-client relationship adds
an overlay to attorney-client employment contracts,” the supreme court
clarified that that “overlay does not alter the basic principle that arbitra-
tion clauses in agreements are enforceable absent proof of a defense.”103
Regarding public policy, the supreme court acknowledged that ongoing
debate surrounds attorney-client arbitration agreements.104 This debate
centers on two opposing policies: (1) “the policy of holding attorneys to
the highest level of ethical conduct”; and (2) “the policy of encouraging
and enforcing arbitration agreements.”105 Lopez argued that the Discipli-
nary Rule 1.03(b) standard for attorney conduct applies to interactions
with prospective clients.106 Disciplinary Rule 1.03(b) provides, “a lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”107 Roy-
ston, Rayzor, on the other hand, argued that Disciplinary Rule and Pro-
fessional Ethics Committee opinions are “advisory and do not impose
legal duties.”108 While noting that it did not intend to minimize attorneys’
ethical obligations, the supreme court held that parties to an agreement
determine the terms of the agreement and that courts must respect and
enforce those terms.109 Further, the supreme court noted that the legisla-
ture has unequivocally indicated that arbitration agreements should be
treated like other contracts.110 In light of this, the supreme court declined
to impose “a legal requirement that attorneys explain to prospective cli-
ents . . . arbitration provisions in attorney-client employment agree-
ments.”111 The supreme court noted that prospective clients are protected
99. Id. at 499.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 501.
102. Id. at 501–02.
103. Id. at 500.
104. Id. at 502.
105. Id. at 502–03.
106. Id. at 503.
107. Id. (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.03(b)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 503–04.
110. Id. at 504 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 2015)).
111. Id. at 504.
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just as any other contracting party.112
The supreme court also addressed Lopez’s claim that the arbitration
provision was illusory because Lopez was required to arbitrate all his
claims and Royston, Rayzor’s only possible claim against Lopez was ex-
cluded from the scope of the arbitration provision.113 “Promises are illu-
sory and unenforceable if they lack bargained-for consideration because
they fail to bind the promisor.”114 When one party is bound to arbitrate
and the other can simply choose whether to arbitrate or not, the arbitra-
tion provision is illusory.115 But limiting the scope of an arbitration provi-
sion to certain claims does not meet this standard and does not render the
provision illusory.116
In sum, this case is an important example of Texas courts upholding the
enforceability of arbitration provisions in attorney-client contracts. Going
forward, attorneys can exclude certain claims from an arbitration provi-
sion without concern that this omission will affect the contract’s enforce-
ability. Most significantly, however, the supreme court’s analysis of the
public policy related to arbitration provisions in attorney-client contracts
and its interplay with Disciplinary Rule 1.03(b) clarifies an area of the law
that has been the subject of ongoing debate.117 While attorneys are held
to high standards, there is no legal requirement, as a matter of public
policy, that attorneys explain the arbitration provisions contained in at-
torney-client employment agreements to prospective clients.
IV. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS AND DOUBLE DERIVATIVE STANDING
Under Texas law, the business judgment rule protects corporate direc-
tors and officers against alleged breaches of their corporate duties if the
actions of the fiduciaries are “within the exercise of their discretion and
judgment in the development or prosecution of the enterprise in which
their interests are involved.”118 In a shareholder derivative action, which
is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation, the
business judgment rule is applied at two separate junctures.119 Initially,
the business judgment rule is applied to the directors’ decision whether to
pursue a cause of action belonging to the corporation.120 The business
judgment rule is then applied again as a defense on the merits against the
shareholder’s derivative claim for the breaches of duties that injured the
112. Id. at 504–05.
113. Id. at 505–06.
114. Id. at 505 (citing In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 566–67 (Tex. 2010)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 502.
118. Cates v. Sparkman, 11 S.W. 846, 849 (Tex. 1889).
119. Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 178 (Tex. 2015).
120. Id. (citing Cates, 11 S.W. at 849).
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corporation.121 In Sneed v. Webre, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the role of the business judgment rule as it applies to a shareholder bring-
ing a derivative suit on behalf of a closely held corporation.122
In Sneed, a shareholder of Texas United Corporation, a closely held
corporation, sued the officers of United Salt Corporation, Texas United’s
wholly owned subsidiary and also a closely held corporation, both as an
individual and derivatively on behalf of Texas United and United Salt.123
The shareholder, who was also a director of both Texas United and
United Salt, alleged that United Salt’s officers did not adequately inform
the directors of United Salt about the full details of a salt mining and
storage facility in Saltville, Virginia, which United Salt agreed to
purchase. The petition alleged that these material non-disclosures about
potential liabilities and additional costs associated with the purchase
“caused United Salt to enter into an unprofitable transaction” that re-
sulted in losses of over $7,000,000 due to United Salt’s officers’ errors,
negligence, and mismanagement.124 The trial court granted the defend-
ants’ pleas to the jurisdiction and motions to dismiss, concluding that the
Texas United shareholder lacked standing to sue.125 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the written shareholder demand requirements do
not apply to closely held corporations and that the shareholder had
double-derivative standing to sue.126 The supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals’ decision.127
The supreme court initially took the opportunity to eliminate any con-
fusion about the application of the business judgment rule as a defense on
the merits to a claim brought on behalf of a closely held corporation.128
The supreme court explained that the “business judgment rule continues
to apply to the merits of a derivative proceeding, whether brought on
behalf of a closely held corporation or any other corporation, when a
corporation’s officers’ or directors’ actions are being challenged.”129 This,
however, is not the case as it applies to the initial requirement that a
derivative plaintiff show that the board’s refusal to pursue a cause of ac-
tion belonging to the corporation was outside of their business
judgment.130
The statutory framework for shareholder derivative actions is found in
121. Id. at 178–79 (citing Cates, 11 S.W. at 848–49).
122. Id. at 173. Under the Texas Business Organizations Code, a closely held corpora-
tion is defined as a corporation that has “fewer than 35 shareholders” and “no shares listed
on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market by one
or more members of a national securities association.” TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.563(a) (West 2015).
123. Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 174–75.
124. Id. at 175–76.
125. Id. at 176.
126. Id. at 176–77.
127. Id. at 193.
128. Id. at 179.
129. Id (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 187.
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§§ 21.551–21.563 of the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC).131
The statutory framework contains a number of requirements that must be
met before a shareholder can bring a suit derivatively on behalf of a cor-
poration, including that a demand must initially be made on the board to
take appropriate action, that the demand must be subjected to indepen-
dent and disinterested evaluation, and that the demand may be dismissed
if the evaluation determines that the claim is not in the corporation’s best
interests.132 The Texas Legislature, however, expressly exempted closely
held corporations from these initial demand requirements and proce-
dures.133 Based on this express exemption, the supreme court concluded
that by removing these requirements, “the Legislature gave shareholders
of closely held corporations the right to pursue corporate causes of action
derivatively without interference from the board of directors.”134 There-
fore, to achieve standing to bring a derivative suit, “a shareholder of a
closely held corporation is not required to make a demand” on the board
or plead and prove that the board’s actions were outside of the scope of
the business judgment rule prior to asserting the derivative suit.135
Finally, the supreme court acknowledged the concept of “double-deriv-
ative” standing, which allows a shareholder of a parent entity to maintain
a derivative action on behalf of the parent’s subsidiary.136 By doing so, it
permitted the Texas United shareholder to assert a derivative claim on
behalf of United Salt because he had an “equitable or beneficial owner-
ship interest in Texas United’s assets,” which included United Salt’s
shares.137
The supreme court’s interpretation of the business judgment rule as it
applies to closely held corporations appears to be partially crafted as a
follow-up to its decision last term in Ritchie v. Rupe.138 In Ritchie, the
Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a cause of action for “minor-
ity shareholder oppression” in a closely held corporation but recognized
131. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 402.001, 402.005 (West 2015). These sections were
previously codified in Article 5.14 of the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA), which
expired on January 1, 2010. TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (West Supp. 2002). The
supreme court analyzed Article 5.14 in Sneed because that was the statute the court of
appeals applied and because the parties did not dispute that application. Sneed, 465 S.W.3d
at 177 n.4. The supreme court, however, noted that the two statutes “are substantially
similar and the outcome here would be the same under either statute.” Id.
132. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.553, 21.554, 21.558.
133. Id. § 21.563(b).
134. Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 185.
135. Id. at 185–86, 193. In this portion of the opinion, the supreme court also noted in
passing that—if justice so requires—TBCA Article 5.14(L) (now TBOC § 21.563(c)) per-
mits a court to treat a derivative proceeding brought by a shareholder of a closely held
corporation as a direct proceeding and permit recovery to be paid directly to the plaintiff.
Id. at 188 (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(L) (West Supp. 2002)). The supreme
court, however, emphasized without any explanation that “the proceeding still must be
derivative” and that “shareholders have no individual or direct claims for injuries to the
corporation.” Id. (citing Wingate v. Hajdik, 795 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1990); Massachusetts
v. Davis, 168 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. 1942)).
136. Id. at 189 (quoting Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1992)).
137. Id. at 193.
138. See id. at 187; Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014).
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that much of the complained-of conduct in such cases could be addressed
via claims for breach of fiduciary duty through shareholder derivative ac-
tion.139 The Sneed decision appears to be crafted in a way that allows
shareholders of closely held corporations to obtain redress without com-
pleting all the formalities that are normally required when a shareholder
sues a corporation.140
B. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES THE DEFINITION OF AN
“INVESTMENT CONTRACT” UNDER THE TEXAS SECURITIES
ACT
Directors and officers should be aware that the Texas Supreme Court
recently embraced a broad definition of “investment contract” for liabil-
ity under the Texas Securities Act (TSA) in Life Partners, Inc. v. Ar-
nold.141 Life Partners bought existing life insurance policies from insured
individuals and then sold interests in the policies to others. The transac-
tions are “referred to as life settlements when the insured is elderly [and]
viatical settlements when the insured is terminally ill.”142 At issue before
the supreme court was whether Life Partners’s sale of the life insurance
interests to its purchasers is a “security” under the TSA and thus gives
rise to possible claims for the sale of unregistered securities and fraud.143
The supreme court ultimately concluded that the life settlements and vi-
atical settlements constituted “investment contracts” under the TSA, and
thus were securities.144
Under the TSA, the term security is defined broadly to include “any
limited partner interest in a limited partnership, share, stock, treasury,
stock, . . . investment contract, or any other instrument known as a secur-
ity, whether similar to those herein referred to or not.”145 In construing
the definition of “investment contract,” the supreme court consulted de-
cisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous federal and state courts
that had previously interpreted and applied the investment contract
term.146 After canvassing prior cases addressing the issue—especially the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.147 and
United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman148—the supreme court dis-
tilled three guiding principles.149
First, the TSA’s definition of security “must be construed broadly to
maximize the protection it provides to investors, while focusing on the
economic realities of the transaction regardless of any labels or terminol-
139. Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 878, 887.
140. See Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 193.
141. 464 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. 2015).
142. Id. at 663 (internal citations omitted).
143. Id. at 662–63.
144. Id. at 686.
145. Id. at 666 (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4.A (West 2015)).
146. Id. at 667.
147. 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
148. 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
149. Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold, 464 S.W.3d 660, 668–80 (Tex. 2015).
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ogy the parties may have used.”150 Second, an investment contract under
the TSA is defined as a
contract, transaction, or scheme through which a person pays money
to participate in a common venture or enterprise with the expecta-
tion of receiving profits, under circumstances in which the failure or
success of the enterprise, and thus the person’s realization of the ex-
pected profits, is at least predominately due to the entrepreneurial or
managerial, rather than merely ministerial or clerical, efforts of
others.151
Finally, the “entrepreneurial or managerial efforts” of others that are rel-
evant to the investment contract analysis “include those that are made
prior to the transaction as well as those that are made after.”152 On this
last point, the supreme court departed from the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in
S.E.C. v. Life Partners, Inc., in which the court of appeals concluded that
pre-purchase efforts could not, by themselves, suffice to cause the ex-
pected profits to “arise predominately from the efforts of others,” and
therefore, Life Partners’ life settlements and viatical settlements were not
investment contracts.153
In this case, the supreme court determined, after analyzing Life Part-
ners’ pre- and post-purchase efforts, that the life settlements and viatical
settlements were investment contracts, and thus securities under the
TSA.154 The supreme court’s decision to consider both pre- and post-
purchase investment efforts certainly expands the definition of invest-
ment contract under the TSA and raises questions about the applicability
of the TSA and its liability provisions to other types of investment
vehicles.
C. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST AN INDIVIDUAL PARTNER
DOES NOT COMMENCE UNTIL FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE PARTNERSHIP IS ENTERED
Texas recognizes an entity theory of partnership, meaning that “[a]
judgment against a partnership is not by itself a judgment against a part-
ner.”155 Nonetheless, a partner is still “jointly and severally liable for all
obligations of the partnership.”156 The Texas Business Organizations
Code also specifies that a creditor cannot seek to satisfy a judgment
against a partner until a judgment is entered against the partnership, and
then can do so only if the judgment against the partnership is unsatisfied
for ninety days.157 The statute, however, does not specify an applicable
limitations period for suits brought against an individual partner to col-
150. Id. at 681.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. S.E.C. v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
154. Life Partners, Inc., 464 S.W.3d at 682–84.
155. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.306(a) (West 2015).
156. Id. § 152.304(a).
157. Id. § 152.306(b)(2).
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lect on a judgment against the partnership.158
The Texas Supreme Court took up the limitations issue in American
Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. Stowers.159 In this case, four partners
formed a general partnership, S & J Investments, “to invest in and man-
age . . . oil and gas properties.”160 S & J and American Star Energy en-
tered into an agreement, and American Star Energy later brought suit
against S & J for breach of that contract in the early 1990s. After several
years of litigation, a verdict, an appeal, reversal, and a second trial, Amer-
ican Star Energy eventually obtained a $227,884.46 judgment against S &
J in 2007. After American Star Energy determined that S & J could not
satisfy the judgment, it sued S & J’s four partners individually in 2010.161
The trial court and the court of appeals determined that the suit against
the individual partners was time-barred because it was brought more than
four years after the underlying breach of contract claim against S & J
accrued.162
The supreme court reversed and held that the limitations period
against an individual partner does not commence until the creditor can
proceed against the partner: generally, ninety days after judgment is ren-
dered against the partnership.163 The supreme court relied on the “deriv-
ative and contingent nature” of the individual partner’s liability and the
structure of the statutory scheme such that a “collection action [is] sepa-
rate from the underlying litigation.”164 The supreme court also analogized
the collection action to a claim for indemnity and noted that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit165 had already reached the same
conclusion about partner liability.166 Finally, the supreme court explained
that its holding did not disrupt the policy purposes underlying the limita-
tions period—including the opportunity to defend an action while wit-
nesses are still available—because those concerns are addressed by the
limitations period applicable to the underlying claims against the partner-
ship.167 As such, the supreme court’s opinion in this case expands the
scope and duration of potential liability a partner in a partnership may
face for the partnership’s judgments.168
158. See Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex.
2015).
159. Id. at 428.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 429.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 431, 435.
164. Id. at 431–32.
165. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 610, 617 (5th Cir.
2010).
166. Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp., 457 S.W.3d at 433.
167. Id. at 434.
168. See id. at 435.
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D. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION FOR A NONRESIDENT CORPORATE OFFICER
FOR ALLEGATIONS OF SECURITIES FRAUD
In Norstrud v. Cicur, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the
contours of Texas courts’ specific personal jurisdiction for purposes of
officer liability in a securities fraud case.169 Andrew Norstrud, a Florida
resident, was the Chief Financial Officer of Amstem Corporation, a Ne-
vada corporation that sold stem cell-based cosmetics that purportedly
promoted youthful skin.170 Norstrud needed to raise $1,000,000 in bridge
note financing to continue the company’s operations as it sought addi-
tional equity financing. Norstrud used Jakobus Jordaan and Stonegate Se-
curities, Inc. to identify Anna and John Cicur as potential bridge
investors. Norstrud helped prepare a presentation about Amstem that
was presented to the Cicurs in Texas, but Norstrud never personally trav-
eled to the state. The Cicurs invested $1,000,000 in Amstem in exchange
for securities and a note, and their investment was secured through stock
of Histostem Company, Ltd., which Amstem purported to own through
its wholly-owned subsidiary. The agreements documenting the Cicurs’ in-
vestment were intended to be performed in Texas.171
The Cicurs sued Norstrud and other defendants for violations of the
Texas Securities Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud, amongst other
claims.172 The Cicurs alleged that Norstrud took their investment and di-
rected the funds to himself, to other companies he controlled, and to
other individuals that assisted him in making Amstem appear to be a le-
gitimate company.173 They also alleged that—contrary to Norstrud’s rep-
resentations—Amstem did not own the Hisostem shares that secured
their investment.174 Norstrud entered a special appearance in the lawsuit,
claiming that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; how-
ever, after a hearing, Norstrud’s special appearance was denied.175 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the special
appearance.176
The court of appeals began by reviewing Texas law on specific personal
jurisdiction. Texas courts can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant if: (1) “the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the
exercise of personal jurisdiction”; (2) “the nonresident defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum state [are] purposeful”; (3) “the claims in question
arise from or relate to the defendant’s purposeful contacts with Texas”;
and (4) “the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant [comports] with traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
169. Norstrud v. Cicur, No. 02-14-00364-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8563, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
170. Id. at *7.
171. Id. at *8.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *8–9.
174. Id. at *9.
175. Id. at *3.
176. Id. at *2.
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tice.”177 The court of appeals had little trouble finding authorization for
personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute because the Cicurs al-
leged that Norstrud committed a tort at least partially in Texas.178
The court of appeals then addressed more difficult questions about
whether Norstrud’s contacts were purposeful and whether the Cicurs’
claims arose from those purposeful contacts.179 In analyzing Norstrud’s
contacts, the court focused on whether Norstrud had minimum contacts
with Texas, whether Norstrud “purposefully availed himself of the privi-
lege of conducting [business]” in Texas, and whether Norstrud sought a
“financial benefit or profit” through his purposeful availment.180 Based
on the trial court’s findings, the court of appeals concluded that Norstrud
“purposefully targeted the Cicurs in Texas, directed misinformation to
them to secure their investment, and used the money that they had in-
vested in a manner inconsistent with the alleged purpose for soliciting
it.”181 The court of appeals was not persuaded by Norstrud’s arguments
that he did not personally make the alleged misrepresentations to the
Cicurs and that he never entered the state.182 The fact that Jordaan and
Stonegate Securities were acting as agents for Amstem and “were utilized
by Norstrud to funnel [the misinformation]” was sufficient, and Nor-
strud’s lack of physical presence in Texas was irrelevant considering the
purposeful direction of his actions.183 Based on these facts, there was lit-
tle doubt that the asserted claims “[arose] from and [were] directly re-
lated to Norstrud’s purposeful contacts.”184
The court of appeals also rejected Norstrud’s argument that the corpo-
rate shield doctrine protected him from personal jurisdiction because his
contacts occurred through his position at Amstem and in his corporate
officer capacity.185 The corporate (or fiduciary) shield doctrine does not
apply “if the officer engaged in tortious or fraudulent conduct directed at
the forum state for which he may be held personally liable” because a
corporate officer remains “primarily liable for his own torts.”186 In this
case, Norstrud’s status as a corporate officer did not shield him from spe-
cific jurisdiction because the Cicurs’ claims were based on alleged misrep-
177. Id. at *18–19.
178. Id. at *20–21 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042(2) (West
2015)).
179. Id. at *21–22.
180. Id. at *22.
181. Id. at *23. The court of appeals also specifically noted that several of the agree-
ments the Cicurs entered into stated that the agreement was to be performed in Texas,
which demonstrated that the parties planned a long-term relationship with the state. Id. at
*24.
182. Id. at *24–26.
183. Id. at *25–26.
184. Id. at *26.
185. Id. at *28. Under the corporate or fiduciary shield doctrine, an “individual’s trans-
action of business within the state solely as a corporate officer does not create personal
jurisdiction over that individual though the state has in personam jurisdiction over the
corporation.” Stull v. Laplant, 411 S.W.3d 129, 135 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(quoting Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985)).
186. Norstrud, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8563, at *28.
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resentations for which Norstrud could be held personally liable.187 The
court of appeals also noted that the corporate shield doctrine would not
apply if Amstem was Norstrud’s alter ego, but it did not conduct any alter
ego analysis because the personal liability exception already established
specific jurisdiction over Norstrud.188
Finally, the court of appeals found that the application of specific juris-
diction “comport[ed] with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” in this case.189 The court of appeals concluded that defending a
lawsuit in Texas was not an excessive burden for Norstrud because Texas
had an interest in adjudicating this matter within its court system and
because the Cicurs had an interest in receiving convenient and just relief
in the state where they reside.190 Accordingly, Norstrud’s special appear-
ance was properly denied.191 This opinion demonstrates the willingness of
Texas courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction against a director or
officer who makes alleged misrepresentations concerning a security to
Texas residents.192
E. COURT FAILS TO FIND A JOINT VENTURE IN REAL ESTATE
PARTNERSHIP
During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the
application of joint venture status to a real estate “partnership” founded
to develop real estate lots.193 In Stutz Road, Ltd. Partnership v. Weekley
Homes, L.P., a residential real estate developer and his company entered
into a development agreement with Weekley Homes’ sister company, Pri-
ority Development.194 Under the agreement, Priority Development
would purchase lots and the developer would perform the work necessary
to convert the land into lots ready for building residential homes. Priority
would then reimburse the developer for all costs, pay the developer a
fixed fee, and pay him a contingent fee based on the revenues from the
project. When the housing market crashed in 2007 and 2008, the develop-
ment stalled and Priority Development never paid any of the contingent
fee.195
One of the claims asserted by the developer and his entity against Pri-
ority Development was for breach of fiduciary duty. Although the devel-
oper was not a shareholder of Priority Development, “[p]arties in a joint
venture owe a fiduciary duty to one another.”196 The court of appeals
listed the requirements for a joint venture: “(1) a community of interest
187. Id. at *28–29.
188. Id. at *29–31 n.8.
189. Id. at *32.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at *33.
193. Stutz Road, Ltd. P’ship v. Weekley Homes, L.P., No. 05-13-01-01752-CV, 2015
Tex. App. LEXIS 11440, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
194. Id. at *2–3.
195. Id. at *6–8.
196. Id. at *26 (citing Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 550 (Tex. 1998)).
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in the venture, (2) an agreement to share profits, (3) an agreement to
share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control or management of the en-
terprise.”197 In this case, while the contingent fee may have given the
developer and his company an interest in the venture and a right to share
in the profits, there was no agreement that parties share in losses or have
a mutual right of control or management.198 Although this particular
joint venture did not give rise to a fiduciary duty, directors and officers,
especially of real estate entities, should be mindful of the elements that
will give rise to a joint venture and create a corresponding fiduciary
duty.199
V. CONCLUSION
The cases decided by the courts during the last Survey period address
important issues that arise in professional liability claims across all indus-
tries—whether against lawyers, healthcare professionals, corporate own-
ers, officers or directors. As Texas courts continue to define the
procedural, evidentiary, and legal requirements for professional liability
claims, it is important that professionals and those that represent profes-
sionals stay attuned to new legal developments. As is clear from the cases
discussed in this article, failure to comply with these legal requirements
can be detrimental to plaintiffs and defendants alike.
197. Id. at *26–27 (citing Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186
(Tex. 1981); Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)).
198. Id. at *27.
199. See id.
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